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“Even as we face these considerable pressures, including the 
requirement of the Budget Control Act to reduce defense 
spending by what we have now as the number of $487 billion over 
10 years, I do not believe -- and I’ve said this before – that we 
have to choose between our national security and fiscal 
responsibility.  The Department of Defense will play its part in 
helping the nation put our fiscal house in order.” 
 
Leon E. Panetta 
Secretary of Defense 
January 5, 2012 




1. Support the Forces Engaged in Overseas Contingency 
Operations 
2. Achieve Affordable Programs 
3. Improve Efficiency 
4. Strengthen the Industrial Base 
5. Strengthen the Acquisition Workforce 
6. Protect the Future 
  
Frank Kendall  
Acting Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)  




• WSARA & NDAA Legislation 
• Affordability 





Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 2009 
 
“The purpose of this law will be to limit cost overruns before they spiral out of 
 
 control.  It will strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing officials 
 
 who will be charged with closely monitoring the weapons systems we're  
 
purchasing to ensure that costs are controlled.  If the cost of certain defense  
 
projects continue to grow year after year, those projects will be closely reviewed, 
 
 and if they don't provide the value we need, they will be terminated.  This law will 
 
 also enhance competition and end conflicts of interest in the weapons  
 
acquisitions process so that American taxpayers and the American military can 
 
 get the best weapons at the lowest cost.”  
      Signing Statement 
      May 22, 2009 
 
       BARACK OBAMA         
 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 




• Improve the effectiveness of the 
acquisition system 
• Strengthen the front end of the 
process 
• Strengthen the execution 
phase 
 
• Improve the acquisition workforce 
• Improve effectiveness 
• Increase size 
 
Focus of Legislation: 
• Primarily from requirements 
generation to post-EMD 
NDAA Legislative Change since 
WSARA 2009 
 
Primary areas of NDAA focus since 2009: 
• Management of MAIS programs 
• Services Acquisition  
• Sustainment and O&S funding 
• Acquisition Workforce size & funding 




USD(AT&L) 2012 Initiatives 
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1. Institute a system to measure the productivity and performance of the acquisition 
system on a program basis 
2. Institute a system to measure the productivity and performance of acquisition 
institutions 
3. Elevate the status, prestige, and professional standards of acquisition personnel 
focusing on key leaders 
4. Increase the cost consciousness and cost-related performance of the total DoD AT&L 
workforce 
5. Institute a process for defining the affordability of MDAPs to include sustainment 
6. Establish an internal ability to evaluate the impact of acquisition decisions on the 
industrial base 
7. Strengthen proactive service contracting management at the major functional level 
8. Achieve small business goals 
9. Strengthen ties to the requirements community 
Affordability 
• Affordability review now required at MS A; directs 
that we establish quantifiable goals for unit 
production cost and sustainment costs 
• Affordability is program and a portfolio attribute 
• Affordability has two main components: 
– How likely are future costs to exceed projected 
resources? 
– What do we have to give up in order to buy this? 
• Example: Army Common Infrared Countermeasure 
(CIRCM) from MS A decision (approved Dec 2011) 
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What is CIRCM and Why Does DoD 
Need It? 
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• CIRCM will be a light-weight, low cost, highly reliable, laser-
based countermeasure system designed to work in conjunction 
with Service missile warning systems 
– Counters IR missiles in all delivery modes for all rotary-wing, tilt-
rotor, and small fixed wing aircraft across the DoD. 
 
• Enables application of laser-based IR countermeasure 
capability across significantly more aircraft types than the 
current ATIRCM/DoN LAIRCM solutions 
 
• Complements current IR countermeasures (flares) 
 
• Enables quicker reaction time against IR missile engagements.  
– Laser fires before flares  
 
 
 Aviation Battlefield Operating Systems 
(BOS) Funding Through POM 13-17 
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•Portfolio upper and lower controls account for reduced availability of resources in out years 
•The portfolio has means to accommodate changes in cost thru mechanisms such as rate of 
production adjustments within the various programs of the portfolio 
 Aircraft Survivability Equipment 
(ASE) Portfolio Funding 
• CIRCM comprises 37% of the ASE portfolio in POM 13-17 
• CIRCM must remain under $225m/yr to remain affordable 
12 
Affordability Assessment - CIRCM 
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“The Army shall manage the program to remain within an 
affordability target (maximum unit cost) of Base Year 2011 
(BY11) $3.75M based on Army Aviation Aircraft Survivability 
Equipment portfolio budget estimated limit of $225M per 
year and an assumed minimum average procurement rate 
of 60 B-Kits (mission equipment) per year and an average 
annual Operating and Support Cost (O&S) target of $72.4k 
per unit, with the target to be validated at MS B. The CAPE 
ICE anticipated Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) of 
$2.5M shall be used as the basis for pre-MS B decision 
making and systems engineering tradeoff analysis to 
reduce costs.” 
 
--Common Infrared Countermeasure (CIRCM) Program Milestone (MS) A 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), 28 December 2011 


















































































MDAP "Sunk" vs "To Complete" Funding
Sunk Cost Remaining Cost (FY12+)
Source: Dec 2010 SARs Reflecting PB12
Source:  Dec 2010 SARs Reflecting PB12 
 
Critical & Significant Nunn-McCurdy Breaches  
Since 1997 
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2011:  AIM-9X Block I (program cancelled), C-130 AMP (program cancelled), JLENS (review in progress),  
          JTRS GMR (program cancelled during review) 
 
2012 (Projected):  EELV (streamlined certification in progress), CVN 78 Class/EMALS (potential) 
16 
Critical Breaches Since 2006 
• DoD reported 28 critical Nunn-McCurdy breaches since 
2006: 
 
– Army: AB3, ARH*, ATIRCM/CMWS, Excalibur, GMLRS,  JLENS, 
Land Warrior**, WIN-T 
– Navy:  AIM-9X, DDG 1000, E-2D AHE, EFV(2)**, RMS, VH-71* 
– Air Force:  AEHF, C-5 RERP, C-130 AMP, EELV(2), Global Hawk, 
JASSM, JPATS, WGS 
– DoD:  Chem Demil-ACWA(2), F-35, JTRS GMR* 
 
* Program cancelled during critical Nunn-McCurdy review 
** Cancellation of the program resulted in a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. 
***  
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Significant Breaches Since 2006 
• DoD reported 12 significant Nunn-McCurdy breaches 
since 2006: 
 
– Army:  ARH, FBCB2, Inc1 E-IBCT*, Javelin, JLENS 
– Navy: H-1 Upgrades 
– Air Force:  AEHF, C-27J, NPOESS, C-130 AMP     
– DoD:  Chem Demil-ACWA, JTRS GMR 
 
* This program reported a significant Nunn-McCurdy breach in December 
2010 and was cancelled in February 2011.   
 
MDAP Cost Growth 
• There are numerous methods we can use to 
classify cost growth  
• Nunn-McCurdy (Congress) – measures only 
unit cost growth 
• AT&L and GAO developed methodology to 
eliminate cost growth due to quantity 






AT&L / GAO Method 
• AT&L had previously disagreed with GAO on cost growth 
methodology in two key areas: 
– Old programs (many back to early 1980’s) continued to carry cost 
growth that had long since been corrected 
– Quantity changes should not be considered in cost growth 
calculations 
• More than two years of discussion and negotiation has 
resulted in a shared cost growth methodology both 
organizations respect 
• New Methodology: Cost growth will be reported, for the 
current portfolio only, over a one year period AND funding 
adjustments due to quantity changes will be accounted for 
in the final calculation 
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1 Year Total Acquisition Cost (TAC) Growth, 
Adjusted for Quantity 
Top 10 
20 Source: 2010 SARs.  All figures in $B, CY12.  BMDS was excluded in all analyses. 
 
For the 2011 MDAP portfolio, we had $73.7B in total cost growth from Dec09 
SARs to Dec10 SARs .  About $26.6B of that is due to changes in quantity, and 
about $47.1B is true “cost growth,” with Procurement growth about $37B and 








$ Change due to 
Quantity 
Quantity Adjusted 
TAC Growth (1 yr)
F-35 287.9 326.5 38.6 0.0 38.6
DDG 51 95.8 101.8 6.0 3.0 3.0
SBIRS HIGH 16.2 18.3 2.1 0.0 2.1
CHEM DEMIL-ACWA 8.1 10.2 2.1 0.0 2.1
STRYKER 16.4 18.2 1.8 0.7 1.1
TRIDENT II MISSILE 52.2 53.2 1.0 0.0 1.0
AEHF 13.1 14.1 1.0 0.0 1.0
DDG 1000 20.1 21.0 0.9 0.0 0.9
NPOESS 6.4 7.3 0.9 0.0 0.9
LHA 6 AMERICA CLASS 6.5 10.1 3.6 2.8 0.8
Sub-Total 58.1 6.5 51.6
Grand Total (all MDAPs) 73.7 26.6 47.1
Total Acquisition Cost Growth 
21 Source:  Dec 2010 SARs 
 
This chart shows cost growth 
before quantity is considered.  
Total acquisition cost growth is 
extremely concentrated between 
these 2 programs, accounting for 
almost 92% of all acquisition cost 
growth for this year (95 MDAPs). 
 
Program A cost growth was real, 
but Program B was entirely due to 
a quantity increase from the RDTE 
SAR to the production SAR. 
Previously, this would all have 
been lumped together as “cost 
growth.” 
Quantity Adjusted Cost Growth 
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This chart shows quantity 
adjusted cost growth. A single 
program accounts for over 85% of 
the total adjusted cost growth 
among the 95 MDAPs 
 
As a whole, the rest of the 
portfolio’s adjusted cost growth 
for this period is low. 
 
Cost Growth Summary 
• Actual cost growth in the current portfolio, when adjusted 
for quantity, is almost totally concentrated in one program 
• Cost growth is not confined to one type of program or 
Service 
• Not all cost growth is bad, even after controlling for 
quantity; there are smart and necessary capability 
increases to platforms that result from deliberate & 
intelligent decision making for the benefit of the 
warfighter and National Security 
• Changes in program quantities used as a tool to allow 
affordability – is there a better way? 
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Should Cost Presentation Template  
• The Program’s “should cost” is the set of program’s initiatives or 
opportunities to reduce costs below the Independent Cost 
Estimate (ICE) level.  It is primarily the basis for a negotiating 
position and result for pending contracts that will be below the 
ICE, but it also includes measures taken to reduce cost beyond 
near term contract actions.  
• See AT&L guidance memos on developing should-cost positions  
(https://portal.acq.osd.mil/portal/server.pt?open=17&objID=106
417&mode=2&cached=true): 
• “Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity 
in Defense Spending,” September 14, 2010 
• “Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power – Obtaining Greater Efficiency 
and Productivity in Defense Spending,” November 3, 2010 
• “Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management,” April 22, 2011 





PROGRAM SHOULD-COST SUMMARY EXAMPLE 
Acquisition Visibility Today  
26 
Why We Do It 
Vision Mission 
Seamless, transparent management of 
DoD’s acquisition portfolio 
Empower leadership to deliver effective 
and efficient Warfighter and business-
decision capabilities  
The authority to provide on-demand acquisition information 
We are the capability that meets leadership’s requirements by providing 
complete, instant access to authoritative and accurate data 
2 
27 
Sign Outside My Boss’s Door…Measure 
Everything With Data! 
4 
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